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International Law and the Use of Force:
America’s Response to September 11
Muna Ndulo
The September 11 terrorist attacks on the World
The Use of Force under the
Trade Center and the Pentagon shocked the world
United Nations Charter
and drew universal condemnation. The following
day, the United Nations General Assembly passed a The creation of the United Nations signaled a
resolution that strongly condemned the attacks and remarkable move to entrust decisions concerning
the use of force and efforts to maintain internaurged international cooperation to bring those
1
tional peace and security to a multinational
responsible to justice. On September 12, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1368,2 which institution. Following the carnage of World War
II, the United Nations Charter of 1945 introduced
unequivocally condemned the terrorist acts and
the notion of a general prohibition on the unilatcharacterized them as a threat to international
eral use of force by sovereign states4 and called for
peace.3
the peaceful settlement of disputes.5 The Charter
Despite international agreement on the attacks’
heinousness, debates ensued regarding an appropri- gives the Security Council the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and
ate response, specifically in terms of the kind of
security, and of identifying threats to international
actions permissible under international law. Other
peace.6 If such a threat is apparent, the Security
controversial issues include how to prosecute those
who planned and ordered the
aggression and whether to
Self-defense includes the right both to repel an armed
classify these acts as war,
terrorism, or crimes against
attack and to take the war to the aggressor state
humanity. The answers to
in order to prevent renewed aggression.
these questions are important
in determining the legality of
the United States’ response,
which began on October 7 as an assertion of the
Council can authorize the use of sanctions against
right of self-defense in the form of military action
the aggressor state.7 If the Security Council deems
in Afghanistan that was designed to destroy the
sanctions or other non-military measures inadinfrastructure and personnel of Al Qaeda, the terequate, it may authorize the use of force as a last
rorist network that America holds responsible for
resort to help maintain international peace and
the devastation of September 11. This article exam- security.8
ines the use of force in international law and its
Besides prohibiting the unilateral use of force,
application to recent events.
the Charter explicitly authorizes the use of force in
self-defense. Article 51 provides that “Nothing in
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the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
Necessity vs. Proportionality
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
There are two qualifications to the use of force in
attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken mea- self-defense: necessity and proportionality. “Necessures necessary to maintain international peace and sity” means that the need of self-defensive action
must be immediate and overwhelming, leaving no
security.”9 Thus, self-defense includes the right
possibility of choosing among alternative means
both to repel an armed attack and to take the war
and no moment for deliberation.11 The rule of
to the aggressor state in order to prevent renewed
proportionality prohibits excessive use of force, in
aggression.
As defined in Article 51, the right of self-defense the sense of the old adage that one must not ward
off a fist fight with a gun. As Secretary-General
envisages a situation in which a state has perpeKofi Annan remarked several years ago, “We must
trated an armed attack against another state. It is
doubtful, however, that this conception includes an fight terrorism and do our utmost to banish it
from the face of the earth. But the force we use to
attack perpetrated by non-state actors unless their
fight should always be proportional and focused
actions can be attributed to a state. Also, the right
on the actual terrorists. We cannot fight them by
of self-defense is predicated on an “armed attack,”
using their own method of inflicting indiscrimimaking the definition of “armed attack” highly
nate violence and terror on innocent civilians,
relevant and—perhaps inevitably—hotly disputed.
including children.”12
The U.S. itself has interpreted “armed attack” to
Various sources of international law provide
include certain terrorist activities. Following the
further
insight into what constitutes excessive
1988 bombing of PanAm flight 103, President
force.
For
example, in 1966, the International
Reagan described the U.S.’s subsequent attacks on
Court
of
Justice
held that “States must never make
Libya as fully consistent with Article 51 of the
civilians
the
object
of attack and must conseUnited Nations Charter. However, one should
quently never use weapons that are incapable of
note that the bombing of Libya was widely condemned and the U.S.’s claimed
justification for the action generThe terrorist attacks of September 11 pose the legal
ally rejected by U.N. member
states.
dilemma of how to respond proportionally when the
Conversely, one can argue
initial attack was itself unreasonable and excessive.
that targeting entities in charge
of or directly engaged in an
armed attack, including non-state
distinguishing between civilian and military taractors, is a permissible measure of self-defense
gets.”13 The terrorist attacks of September 11 pose,
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.10 On this
basis, a military mission to capture and arrest those therefore, the legal dilemma of how to respond
proportionally when the initial attack was itself
ordering and/or directly engaged in an ongoing
unreasonable and excessive, particularly in its
program of demonstrated hostility would also be
having been intentionally directed at civilians.14
permissible under the Charter as an act of selfNevertheless, to hold an entire nation accountable
defense, for lending support to terrorists who
for the acts of a few does not appear to be lawful,
attack another state is effectively a use of force
for collective punishment would, by definition,
against both the territorial integrity and political
entail the unjustifiable suffering of innocent
independence of that state.
populations.
6
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The United Nations Security Council
This stricture is especially pertinent to the phenomenon of state-sponsored terrorism. Individual
terrorists perpetrated the September 11 acts but
they could not have done so without a state providing them sanctuary and logistical support. The
U.S. has claimed that it has strong and compelling
evidence that implicates Afghanistan in the
September 11 attacks. Assuming this evidence is
convincing, one must decide whether or not
Afghanistan is liable for the acts of Al Qaeda. For
Afghanistan to be liable, the evidence must show
that Al Qaeda acted under its authority or that
the Taliban regime was part of the Al Qaeda
conspiracy.
If the September 11 attacks can be attributed to
Afghanistan, an application of the law leaves no
doubt that the U.S. has suffered an armed attack
that entitles it to exercise self-defense against
Afghanistan. It should also be noted that Article 51
requires a state exercising its right of self-defense to
report the measures it has taken to the Security
Council. In a letter to the President of the Security
Council, dated October 7,15 the United States
reported that, in response to the September 11
attacks and in accordance with all states’ inherent
right to individual and collective self-defense, the
U.S. armed forces were initiating actions designed
to prevent and deter further attacks on its territory
and interests. These actions would include military
Spring 2002

strikes against Al Qaeda terrorist training camps
and military installations of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan.16 Although the United States is entitled under international law to use force to punish
those responsible for the armed attacks committed
against it, international support for American
action will be greater if the facts pointing to the
entities responsible for the terrorism of September
11 become clearer.
Questions inevitably have arisen about the
proportionality of the campaign against Afghanistan—especially because the campaign has covered
the entire country. Even more questions would
arise should the United States choose to extend the
campaign to Iraq and other nations that the United
States perceives as supporting terrorism. Such an
extension would beg the questions of what specific
armed attacks those countries were involved in to
justify the United States’ exercise of self-defense
and whether U.S. military initiatives met the condition of necessity.

Self-Defense and
Security Council Actions
Because Article 51 preserves the inherent right of
individual state or collective self-defense against an
armed attack, Security Council authorization is not
necessary for actions permitted by the theory of
7

self-defense. Notably, however, this right continues Coordinating an International
only until the Security Council has taken the meaResponse to Terrorism
sures necessary to maintain international peace and
The events of September 11 have demonstrated
security. One view holds that the aggrieved state
more than ever the need for a coordinated interand its friends and allies may decide for themselves
national response to terrorism. The events showed
to exercise their rights of individual and collective
that innovations in global communications have
self-defense until either peace is restored or the
given international standing to some local terrorist
Security Council, by its own affirmative vote,
groups, while terrorist organizations with global
decides that self-defense has gone too far and has
reach use rapid international transportation to hit,
itself become a threat to international peace.17 A
run, and hide. In addition, perpetrators of terrorcountervailing view argues that when the Security
ism in one country frequently use other states as
Council assumes jurisdiction, the injured party’s
safe havens or for fund-raising, sometimes hiding
right to self-defense is suspended until the Council
among emigrée diaspora communities. They may
affirmatively decides it cannot deal effectively with
receive training abroad and use foreign countries
the problem.18 A third view opines that the cusfor staging terrorist acts or as launching bases for
tomary law of self-defense is not abridged in any
their operations elsewhere. Some terrorist organiway by the Charter and remains intact until the
zations are engaged partly in legitimate trade, and
Security Council has dealt successfully with the
others in drugs and weapons smuggling. Most
controversy. Yet another view is that Article 51 is
do not operate in a vacuum but rather alongside
not an affirmative grant of a right of self-defense
non-violent militant groups pursuing the same
but a description of circumstances in which the
objectives by peaceful means. Terrorist organizaexercise of an “inherent right” is not precluded by
tions are global entities; they permeate all
the Charter.19 Those circumstances, however, are
subject to a temporal limit; they
endure only until the Security
The fight against terrorism cannot succeed
Council has taken measures to
maintain peace and security.20
without commensurate international cooperation
In practice, it does not matter
which interpretation of Article
and strategic insights into terrorist operations.
51 one adopts, for each of the
five permanent members of the
jurisdictions. The fight against terrorism cannot
Security Council hold veto power in any Council
succeed without commensurate international covote.21 With respect to the present military operaoperation and strategic insights into terrorist
tion against Afghanistan, any action by the United
Nations Security Council that does not accord with operations. The international community should
adopt and enforce existing conventions on terrorAmerican plans will almost certainly attract an
ism, and must work toward the elaboration of a
American veto. In addition, should the Security
comprehensive treaty to deal with this scourge.22
Council take any action, the question of whether
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373,
the measures are sufficient to maintain internaadopted by the Security Council on September 28,
tional peace will be subject to the same
is a good start toward such a comprehensive
considerations.
treaty.23 It is a wide-ranging resolution that calls
on all states both to prevent and suppress the
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financing of terrorism and to criminalize the willful
provisioning or collection of funds for such acts. It
also calls on states to freeze the funds, assets, and
economic resources of persons who commit or
attempt to commit terrorist acts, and of persons
and entities who act on behalf of terrorists. Further, the Resolution calls on states to prohibit
nationals, persons or entities in their territories
from making funds, financial assets, economic
resources, financial or other related services available to persons who commit or attempt to commit,
facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts. According to the Resolution, states must
also refrain from providing any form of support to
entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, take
the necessary steps to prevent the commission of
terrorist acts, and deny safe haven to those who
finance, plan, support, and commit terrorist acts.
Significantly, Security Council Resolution
1373 is binding on all U.N. member states; it
was adopted under Chapter Seven of the United
Nations Charter, which authorizes the Security
Council to take measures to maintain international
peace and security. The primary difficulty with
Resolution 1373 is that it does not provide common legislative and enforcement standards. For
example, the Resolution does not define what
constitutes a “severe punishment” for a terrorist
act, or at what point a state is doing “all in its
power” to stop terrorists from operating in its
territory.
In spite of these omissions, Security Council
Resolution 1373 can form the basis of a comprehensive treaty because it identifies major factors
that facilitate terrorist operations. An ideal comprehensive treaty would also provide the following:
extradition measures that would ensure the apprehension and prosecution of terrorists, wherever
they might reside; punitive standards by which the
international community could hold states that
harbor terrorists accountable; financial regulations
that would make the financing of terrorist activities
difficult; and facilitated international information
exchange regarding terrorist activities.
Spring 2002

What Else is Needed
to Combat Terrorism?
Whatever the world does in response to terrorist
violence, its measures should not entail harsh security controls that tend to undermine civil liberties
and international freedom. At the same time, the
world should ensure that those who commit acts of
terrorism are put on trial in accordance with the
principles of law. The tragic events of September
11 should not lead to more prejudice or tolerance
of prejudice in an already too-prejudiced world.
The international community must redouble its
efforts to eradicate poverty, inequality, and armed
conflicts throughout the world, for these factors
create the perfect breeding grounds for terrorists.
Such efforts would entail the development and
advocacy of socio-economic policies, framed under
the auspices of the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, that reduce the inclination to engage in
heinous violence for ideological reasons. In short,
the political grievances that give terrorists a constituency must be addressed and, to some degree,
resolved.
Every effort must be made to rid the world of
dictatorial and undemocratic regimes. Corruption,
for instance, facilitates the production of false and
forged documents, which are essential to the movement of terrorists and the execution of their
murderous plans. Experience has taught the world
that pursuing effective action against criminal
organizations of every type is always more difficult
against a background of corruption and irresponsible regimes. Thus, terrorism must be fought with
increased support for democratization programs,
judicial reform, conflict resolution, poverty alleviation, economic reform, and health and education
enhancement programs.
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22. Before embarking on what should be done, however,
one should examine what has already been accomplished
on this subject. In terms of aircraft hijacking, the following international agreements are already in place: the 1963
Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft ( Sept. 14, 1963, 1969
United Nations Treaty Series 222); the 1970 Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Dec.
16, 1970, 1973 United Nations Treaty Series 106.); and
the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Aircraft (Sept. 23,
1971, 1974 United Nations Treaty Series 178). Two more
recently adopted treaties are relevant to the creation of an
effective regime against terrorism: the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (General Assembly Resolution 52/164, United Nations General
Assembly Official Record, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/
52/164 (1997) ), and the Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism (General Assembly Resolution 54/109, United Nations General Assembly Official
Record, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (1999).
Another important legal instrument to consider is the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted in 1999.
23. United Nations Security Council Official Record,
4385th mtg., United Nations Document S/RES/1373
(2001).
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